The commissioners accordingly surveyed two routes, a northern and a southern. The northern was reported to be the more feasible. West of the Connecticut it was manifestly so, as it had the natural valleys of the Deerfield and Hoosac rivers, forming a continuous and very direct course from the Connecticut to the Hudson, separated only by the intervening Hoosac Mountain. But that was a formidable intervention. It was true, indeed, that the northern branch of the Hoosac and the western of the Deerfield originated near each other, in a depression on the crest of the mountain. But this point of common origin was considerably northward of the general east and west course of the contemplated canal, and at an elevation of two thousand feet above tide-water. To carry the canal up the lied of these streams would he attended with much difficulty, while the increased distance of eighteen miles and the numerous locks required would not only render the canal expensive in construction, but make its navigation tediously slow. Accordingly, it was proposed to go through the mountain instead of over it, and the engineers gave a very encouraging report, on the score of expense, in favor of the tunnel. It was estimated by them that a tunnel four miles in length could be constructed for less than a million dollars, while to go over the mountain would cost more than two millions, and the necessarily slow progress through the numerous locks would consume at least eighteen hours, or nearly two days of traveling time, whereas the tunnel could be traversed in an hour and a quarter. The balance was clearly in favor of the tunnel, and as there was at that time a widespread feeling in the old States in behalf of internal improvements, as they were called, and a strong desire to connect New England with New Orleans and the Southwest by a continuous interior water communication, the success of the enterprise seemed assured. The entire cost of the proposed canal from Boston to the Hudson was estimated at $6,000,000. It was presumed that the State of Massachusetts would grant a loan to further the work. It was expected also that the tax upon sales at auction and some other sources of income would be appropriated for the construction of the canal; and in accordance with the sentiment and practice of that time, strange as it may now appear to us, it was also hoped that the aid of a lottery would be authorized. The commissioners, however, felt constrained even then to offer some argument in favor of such a license. And this was their course of reasoning. Having ascertained that $250,000, probably, were annually expended in Massachusetts in the purchase of lottery tickets, notwithstanding the absolute prohibition of the traffic, and adverting to the fact that lotteries have been used for various excellent purposes, they urge that “if an unabatable evil does exist, let it be converted to the best possible purposes,” — which in this case, of course, would be the building of the desired canal. The commissioners also say, “they would be the last among their fellow-citizens to sanction immorality, or impair the omnipotence of justice, but with deference offer such remarks as may tend to the development of truth, die confirmation of what shall be found salutary, and the rejection of that which is supererogatory in our generally most excellent code of laws.” The argument of the commissioners then closes with the very pertinent and practical announcement that, “should a lottery be resorted to as one of the means of raising funds, it can be affirmed with confidence that $20,000 may be thus annually obtained, and probably a much greater sum.”

At this remove of time, one can hardly read without a smile the fervid rhetoric with which the commissioners clothe their report.